



**Stockholm
University**

Department of Economics

Course name: The Economics of Discrimination
Course code: EC2107
Type of exam: Main
Examiner: Mahmood Arai
Number of credits: 7.5
Date of exam: 2019 06 04
Examination time: 09:00 -12:00
Aids: No aids are allowed

Write your identification number on each answer sheet (the number stated in the upper right hand corner on your exam cover).

Start each new question on a new answer sheet.

Explain notions/concepts and symbols. If you think that a question is vaguely formulated, specify the conditions used for solving it. Only legible exams will be marked.

The exam consists of 5 questions. Each question is worth 20 points, 100 points in total. For the grade E 45 points are required, for D 50 points, C 60 points, B 75 points and A 90 points.

Your results will be made available on your Ladok account (www.student.ladok.se) within 15 working days from the date of the examination.

Good luck!



PART 1:

1- Give an overview of the Becker theory of Discrimination, Statistical Discrimination and Implicit Discrimination. Discuss the decision making problem, the employer's objective function, the information structure and the behavioral assumptions.

20 points

PART II:

The following studies (mentioned in questions 2-5) aim at identifying the effects of perceived gender, ethnicity etc. on some outcomes. Discuss the methods used and the limitations discussed in the study that the authors try to deal with. Be clear about the method and the variation in the data that are used to examine these effects. Please do not repeat what is in the abstract.

2- Neumark, D: Bank R J. and Van Nort Kyle D. Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1996.

Abstract: In an audit study of sex discrimination in hiring, comparably matched pairs of men and women applied for jobs as waiters and waitresses at restaurants in Philadelphia. In high-price restaurants (where earnings are higher), job applications from women had an estimated probability of receiving a job offer that was lower by about 0.4, and an estimated probability of receiving an interview that was lower by about 0.35. Both estimated differentials are statistically significant. Additional evidence suggests that customer discrimination partly underlies the hiring discrimination.

20 points

3- Bertrand M. and Mullainathan, S. Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor, *The American Economic Review*, 2004.

We study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. To manipulate perceived race, resumes are randomly assigned African-American- or White-sounding names. White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Callbacks are also more responsive to resume quality or White names than for African-American ones. The racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the U.S. labor market.

20 points



4- Arai, M. and Thoursie, P. S. Renouncing Personal Names: An Empirical Examination of Surname Change and Earnings, *Journal of Labor Economics*, 2009.

Abstract:

We study the effects of surname change to Swedish-sounding or neutral names on earnings for immigrants from Asian/African/Slavic countries. To estimate this effect, we exploit the variation resulting from different timing of name changes across individuals during the 1990s. The results imply that there is a substantial increase in annual earnings after a name change, no effects on earnings prior to a name change, and no positive general effects of a new name for other groups that renounced a foreign name. Based on these findings, we argue that these effects are due to name change as a response to discrimination.

20 points

5- Goldin, C. and Rouse, C. Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians, *The American Economic Review*, 2000.

Abstract: A change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras-adoption of "blind" auditions with a "screen" to conceal the candidate's identity from the jury-provides a test for sex-biased hiring. Using data from actual auditions, in an individual fixed-effects framework, we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired. Although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction, the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras.

20 points